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Aaron P. Jackson, PhD, is the training director of Brigham Young University’s counseling psychology
doctoral program. He has long been interested in the interface between faith and psychology. Of late he
has focused on the implications of a relational philosophy for applied psychology and the role of values
in psychotherapy.

A

free interactions are better than other interactions—a
clear moral value.
Despite Tjeltveit’s (1999) comprehensive critique of
value-free therapy and nearly two decades of supporting philosophical and empirical research, professional
psychology continues to cling to the notion that psychotherapy can and should be a value-free or valueneutral enterprise. Clinging to this notion keeps us
from attending to the more important question, which
is, “Given that all human interactions are to some degree clashes of values and moralities, how do we engage each other in love across those differences in a
way that provides community and safety?” Psychology
has been so consumed with the notion that it should
not make moral judgments that it has been unwilling
and unable to acknowledge the unavoidability of its
own values and moralities. Rogers provides a striking
example of this. He clearly believes it is better (i.e.,
morally superior and more valuable) to act on one’s independent individualistic intuition than to follow the
prescriptions of other individuals, societies, or gods.
He believes it is better to be “self-responsible” (1961,
p. 55) than to be responsible to others and that being
self-responsible and responsible to others are mutually
exclusive. Ironically, this is Rogers’s moral imperative,

t the outset let’s acknowledge that the need for
safe spaces for our LGBTQ siblings comes from
Latter-day Saints’ failing to be good Christians in the
first place. At least, we have failed to be good enough
Christians. If Latter-day Saints were ideal Christians,
being with them would already be a safe space—regardless of Rogers’s (1961) co-opting or corrupting
the constructs that comprise it. I will return to this
issue at the end of my comments.
A key question for Gantt and Thayne (pp. 3–21)
is whether Rogers’s theory somehow corrupts our attempts to create genuinely safe spaces. I appreciate
and generally agree with their concerns about notions
like unconditional positive regard and their critique of
how Rogers’s ideas have even distorted what we mean
by love and hate. In addition to those issues, I would
like to address the question of what we mean by safe.
To me, a primary problem with Rogers’s approach is
that he imagines a value-free human interaction and
establishes this view as a primary criterion for safety. He supposes that counselors and other empathic
helpers can engage their clients and others without
bringing any notions of what is good or bad to the
experience. This proposal is both impossible and contradicted by the fact that Rogers proposes that value37
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the basis on which he, albeit kindly, is judging and influencing his clients—despite his claims to the contrary. Again, the question for all of us is not whether
to judge and influence one another but rather how to
do so in an honest and loving way.
I see two problems within Rogers’s ideas. First, he
proposes that we provide unconditional positive regard
for people even though we clearly do not have positive
regard for their inauthentic way of being. However,
this is not radically different from the Christian’s dilemma. The mandate to love all people regardless of
background, beliefs, and identities is clear. The means
by which we do so is much less clear. I agree that
Rogers muddies the waters by supplanting love with
positive regard. However, the fundamental dilemma,
regardless of terminology, is how to love (or regard)
across our inherently different values and moralities. The challenge of Christianity is learning to love
“strangers,” to “[take] them in” (Matthew 25:31–46).
This certainly seems synonymous with a safe space.
Rogers assumes a safe space can be created simply by
adopting a non-judgmental stance. However, such a
stance (if possible) precludes any genuine love. One
cannot love from such a privileged and distant position. In LDS parlance, we might call this “love feigned”
(cf. D&C 121:41). I cannot love you unless I know
you, and I cannot know you except in terms of how
we might agree and differ. Interestingly, in describing
those who achieve a celestial glory, Joseph Smith said,
“they see as they are seen, and know as they are known,
having received of his fulness and of his grace” (D&C
76:94). It may be that our capacity to know and love
across our differences comes by “grace.”
Second, Rogers seems to place the sole authority for
one’s authenticity within oneself. He does this without
much discussion of how one becomes the ultimate authority on oneself. He says,

come to psychotherapy in the first place. From Rogers’s perspective, the purpose of psychotherapy seems
to be to help the client see that they cannot, and should
not, depend on or be influenced by anyone else in their
quest to be authentic. I suppose the ultimate goal is
for the client to disallow the therapist’s values as they
paradoxically adopt them. Rogers’s ideal seems to end
in a solipsistic nightmare of isolation. Ironically, Rogers, whom so many have seen as the father of empathic
listening and understanding, has a philosophy that
undermines even the possibility of real empathy—let
alone the gospel notions of “mourning with those that
mourn” and “bearing one another’s burdens” (Mosiah
18:8–9). He says,
Every individual exists in a continually changing world
of experience of which he [sic] is the center. . . . An
important truth in regard to this private world of the
individual is that it can only be known, in any genuine
or complete sense, to the individual himself [sic]. . . . I
can never know with vividness or completeness how a
pinprick or a failure on an examination is experienced
by you (Rogers, 1951, pp. 483–484).

Again, in what seems a profound irony, Rogers’s philosophy puts severe limits on one’s ability to relate to
and empathize with another. This inherent distance
only allows for people to tolerate one another, not really understand and connect with one another (cf. Williams & Jackson, 2015). The implications of the individualistic philosophy espoused by Rogers and most
mainstream theorists have recently been explicated by
both philosophers (e.g., Oliver, 2001) and psychologists (e.g., Gergen, 2009). Latter-day Saints, with
their understanding of a literal atonement and the understanding that Christ became better able to “succor
his people” (Alma 7:12) by vicariously suffering with
and for us, might be able to extend our understanding
of the true nature of empathy and our capacity to suffer with each other.
I have one caution regarding Gantt and Thayne’s
analysis. The casual reader might interpret their description of God’s expectations, contingencies, and
chastenings as an excuse for humans to do the same.
I think this is the crux of what has kept Latter-day
Saints from being the safe havens that our LGBTQ
siblings might have expected us to be. We have followed the world’s example in discriminating against
them and persecuting them. The scriptures teach us

The client finds that it is his [sic] own organism which
supplies the evidence upon which value judgments
may be made. He [sic] discovers that his own senses,
his own physiological equipment, can provide the data
for making value judgments and for continually revising them (Rogers, 1951, p. 501).

To me, it is this radical individualism that creates
the greatest philosophical and moral issues for Rogers’s theory. His model is essentially solipsistic and
seems to raise the question of why someone would
38
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that such “persecution of the saints” (D&C 121:38)
comes as a result of our own tendency to “cover our
sins, or to gratify our pride, our vain ambition, or to
exercise control or dominion” (D&C 121:37). I think
it has been easy for Latter-day Saints and other Christians to imagine that they are the ones who have the
responsibility to “humble, chasten, and rebuke” (Gantt
& Thayne, p. 13) others. To me, it seems that such acts
are almost exclusively God’s purview. For us to go beyond Rogerian tolerance and quasi-empathy, we will
need to take Moroni’s advice to become more charitable and, “pray unto the Father with all the energy of
heart, that [we] may be filled with this love” (Moroni
7:48).
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